

### Approved For Release 2008/08/05 : CIA-RDP85B00552R001100080004-3


# COMPRENTAL

13 January 1982

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NOTE FOR:	DDA ADDA		FI 100 3	
FROM:	EO/DDA			
SUBJECT:	Agenda Item for 15 January Meeting Terrorism	g with EX DIR -		25X1
"Terrorist Security h (domestic and I woul terrorist		or physical and person the boom physical and person the boom of th	connel protection experts in CCCR; info on in communications olved.	<sup>25X1</sup> X1
"parochia frequently not think	While I do not question the need fo " interests in the terrorist field does not know what the "left" is we are in a position to exploit ou	, I suspect that the	Further, I do	05.74
area.		in a State Departm	ent working group	25X1
3. I note that C/CCCR is participating in a State Department working group on the Dozier kidnapping caseI wonder if C/CCCR has all info available re terrorism of the Red Brigade as it must exist in the DO, DO, OS, etc.				25 <b>X</b> 1
4. There is no question in my mind for the existence of these various groups working on the terrorist problem and their placement among the directorates. In order to have an effective interchange, however, I would suggest the creation of a standing committee with either D/Security or the terrorist group chief in the DO being designated as chairman. The committee would meet on a weekly basis to ensure data is exchanged; its members would have the expertise cited in para l above; and its chairman and accompanying expert members, as appropriate, would represent the Agency in dealings with other U.S. Government activities in this area. When a specific terrorist crisis occurs, the standing committee, with additional resources as needed, would be transformed into a full-time task force to deal with the specific incident				25X1 25X1 25X1
Attachmen	t			\$0 50.55
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## ORGANIZATION FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM

#### I. The Problem

- --Terrorism is probably the number 1 threat to the U.S. Government and people in the present decade. It is equal to or possibly second only to the Soviet and drug threats.
- --The threat, as we see it, is not solely anti-U.S. terrorism but the greater problem of worldwide terrorism and the possible effects on the security of the United States, i.e., terrorism bringing down another government such as Saudi Arabia could possibly cause the U.S. to go to war.

## II. Facts Bearing on the Problem

- --The key organizational elements of the U.S. Government program to combat terrorism are the EXCOM and Working Group on Terrorism established under the NSC Special Coordination Committee. CIA's designated member on both the EXCOM and Working Group on Terrorism is the Chief, Terrorism Group, International Activities Division, Directorate of Operations.
- --A number of Agency components have some piece of the "terrorism problem"; IAD in the DO, the Office of Security has responsibilities for physical and personal protection (domestic and foreign), the Office of Medical Services has its experts in CCCR, DDI in analytical work, SCS/OSO in the DDS&T, and OTS gets involved. It is likely under this arrangement that the right hand frequently does not know what the left hand is doing in this area of concern.

#### III. Proposed Solution

- -- The CIA is the only entity in Government which has the expertise and capability to deal with this threat internationally.
- --If we are to counter terrorism, dedicated resources are necessary to cope with the problem. We must have dedicated case officers, dedicated intelligence officers, dedicated assets, dedicated covert action personnel, etc. There must be an office or group of people solely dedicated to this problem.
- --Since the DDO and DDI are organized on a regional basis and terrorism is not a regional problem, we would propose a model similar to the SE Division be established to cope with the problem.
- --This group would devote its efforts to intelligence collection, infiltration, propaganda, political action, disinformation, etc.
- --Since the DO effort in the case of terrorism is more critical than the analysis and technical collection, the group could reside in the Operations Directorate. In this case the group should report directly to the DDO. By separating it from IAD you remove the impression that CA is the more vital part of the effort than collection. The group does not necessarily have to be large in size.
- --An alternate solution would be to have the head of the group report to the DCI through the EXDIR CIA.
- -- The complement of the group should include detailees from the Intelligence Community.
- --The balance of the Agency effort in terrorism such as analysis, technical collection, and support should be coordinated and tasked by a single

- special assistant reporting to the Deputy Director of each directorate.

  This individual should attend regular staff meetings and work directly with the head of the terrorism group.
- --Within the terrorism group there would be established an operations center. The center, not unlike those used by large metropolitan police forces, would collect all information on terrorist activities, keeping an up-to-date worldwide picture. It would develop identities and the modus operandi of the different terrorist groups. It would be responsible for tasking of collection by Agency and Intelligence Community human and technical assets. It would maintain day-to-day interface with intelligence agencies and Agency components involved in analysis of information. It would provide information and guidance on covert activities to infiltrate, negate or frustrate terrorist activities.
- --In this proposal the group would not be a staff, it would have a management role in countering terrorism.